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A Guardianship Jury Trial
Case Study
An attorney relates his recent
experiences with guardianshipjury
trials. He shares insights gained and
explains why the jury system can serve
as an effective tool for advocating on
behalf of elders.

By Steven C. Perlis
ooking back, my two guardianship jury
trials this summer were an important
pioneering effort for me. I was personally testing a previously untried tool for
advocating on behalf of elderly clients.
Success with the jury would be great, and even failure would at least be useful as a learning experience.
Because jury trials are not that common in guardianship cases, the Guardianship Special Interest
Group ("Guardianship SIG") suggested that I relate
some of my experiences in deciding whether to accelerate the case on the trial calendar, selecting jury
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instructions and the jurors, and calling my client as
a witness.
Pretrial Chronology
My second jury trial concluded on July 20, 2000,
with a unanimous verdict awarding full guardianship both of the estate and person against my client.
Was this therefore a failure? I think not. I learned
much from the experience.
The sole issue was competence. My opponent
was the Cook County Public Guardian's Office. The
staff attorneys, regular attendees at NAELA programs, have a history of vigorous and enlightened
advocacy on behalf of seniors in adult disabled (as
well as juvenile) cases.
This case, from the beginning, promised to be
both hard fought and a bit entertaining. I entered
the case as the court-appointed guardian ad litem.
This process, at least in Chicago, involves being chosen by the trial judge from a revolving pool when an
adult guardianship petition is brought. My initial role
in such a case is to advise the alleged disabled person (ADP) of his or her rights, and act as the eyes
and ears of the court in making a written report.
During one of the conferences before the trial began, the court entered an order changing my role to
attorney for the ADP.
My first visit to the ADP was unremarkable.
When I went to her house, no one appeared to be at
home, so I left the statement of rights in her mailbox, and a note asking that she call me. Within a
day, she called me, and we had a detailed discussion
about the Public Guardian's petition. She and a friend
came to the first court hearing on April 30, 2000. At
that time, appearing in my capacity as guardian ad
litem, I presented my written report to the court.
Basically, the report stated that the ADP objected to
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guardianship in general, as well as to the Public
Guardian being her guardian. She agreed, on my
advice, to accept service of the petition at the Sheriff's
Office at the courthouse, to avoid having to be served
with the summons at her home.
On May 2, 2000, with the ADP's consent, I appeared on her behalf a second time and presented an
appearance, jury demand, motion to advance matter to trial, and response to petition to appoint a
guardian. In Illinois, a person must be over seventy
years of age and show good cause in order for the
court to advance the trial to an earlier date. The court
indeed granted our motion, and shortened the time
the Public Guardian had to complete discovery and
file pretrial motions to sixty days. At a status hearing on May 11, 2000 the court scheduled the trial
for July 18, 19, and 20, 2000.
On June 28, 2000, opposing counsel and I appeared at a jury instruction conference. Because some
of the instructions were not worked out to the court's
satisfaction, there was a second jury trial conference
on July 11, 2000. This, too, resulted in some unfinished business, so we returned a third time on July
13, 2000. At that time, our jury instructions (which
were principally written by me) and the voir dire
questions (which were principally written by opposing counsel) were approved by the court.
Jury Instructions
Attorneys who have not done a jury trial lately, or at
all, frequently ask what instructions were used, and
occasionally want a copy. I have provided the Guardianship SIG with a copy of the marked-up
instructions, so these are available on request. The
reader should know that the set in the SIG forms
library contains references to the Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions and to case law and statutory authority.
These references did not appear on the so-called
"clean set" that was actually read and then given to
the jurors to use when they deliberated. The preface
to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions states that
the exact wording of these instructions should be
used wherever appropriate, and modifying language
should be used wherever appropriate. Where no
standard instructions are available, then a "non-IPI"
instruction is to be given to the jurors.
One of the pattern instructions includes a definition of "clear and convincing evidence." This is
interesting because the commentators to the Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions recommended not giving
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the jurors an actual definition. The commentators
felt that more confusion than clarity would result
from actually giving such an instruction. At the first
conference, the Public Guardian argued unsuccessfully that the evidentiary standard should be
preponderance of the evidence. We countered that
although there was no Illinois case so holding, dicta
in two cases talked in terms of clear and convincing
evidence. We also argued that these proceedings involved radical deprivation of rights and liberties, and
the same evidentiary standard used in civil commitment and criminal cases should apply in adult
guardianship adjudications. The court agreed with
us on this point.
Both sides argued whether a limited guardianship instruction should even go to the jurors. We
agreed on four instructions:
*
"
*
*

fully able as to making and communicating
personal decisions,
fully able as to making and communicating
estate decisions,
fully unable as to making and communicating personal decisions, and
fully unable as to making and communicating estate decisions.

In addition, there were two "held back" instructions: only partially unable as to making and
communicating personal decisions, and only partially
unable as to making and communicating estate decisions. Over the Public Guardian's objections, the
judge allowed the latter two-limited guardianship
instructions to go to the jurors, along with the four
that were agreed on.

Voir Dire
This process was interesting inasmuch as the court
sought to keep a rather tight rein on the number of
questions counsel could ask. Case law says it is an
abuse of discretion to refuse to allow any questions
from counsel at all; however, there is considerable
leeway for the court to restrict the number or nature
of those questions. The questions agreed to by both
sides were written out ahead of time, and the court
would ask these questions of each prospective juror.
Each attorney was allowed to ask only two additional questions of each juror.
Each side had three "peremptory" challenges
(namely, no reason needs to be given for the
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challenge), and an unlimited number of challenges
for cause. A prospective juror can be challenged "for
cause" when he has a fixed and abiding bias or prejudice that he cannot set aside. A prospective juror
can also be challenged "for cause" for one of the
reasons listed on a statutory checklist. Illinois statute allows a "for cause" challenge when the
prospective juror...
*
*
•
*
*
*
•
*

"

Is under eighteen years of age;
Is infirm or decrepit;
Is not free from all legal exceptions;
Is not of fair character or approved integrity;
Does not have sound judgment;
Is not well informed;
Is unable to understand the English language;1
Is not one of the regular panel, having served
as a juror on the trial of a case in any court
in the county within one year previous to the
time of the person being offered as a juror; 2
Is a party to a suit pending for trial in that
court, 3 having sought within the past sixty
days the position of a juror, or the fact that
any attorney or party has sought the placing
of such a juror upon a jury within the past
4
sixty days .

Since the judge was very knowledgeable about what
constitutes a challenge for cause, opposing counsel
was unsuccessful in getting any of their challenges
for cause allowed.
After the judge introduced herself, the deputy,
and counsel to the jurors, she began by explaining
that the case involves a petition to adjudicate disability, that the petitioner is asking that the ADP be
adjudicated a disabled person, and that the ADP disagrees. The judge asked the for-cause questions. One
prospective juror was excluded because he was a
party to a pending case. Another person was excluded
because of a license-suspension violation. On the
other hand, a person with a pending bankruptcy case
was kept on the prospective panel. For the sake of
keeping track, the jurors were questioned in clusters
of four. The juror numbers were as follows:
The Public Guardian's counsel used all three of
their peremptory challenges. One was a woman who
said that persons facing guardianship should not have
their rights taken away. She reluctantly said she could
be fair to both sides. Another prospective stated that
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his son has Tourettes syndrome, that if a person can
care for himself then the court should not interfere,
that he had sued the Illinois Tollway in 1988 and
felt that he gotten a raw deal, that his parents had
been in a nursing home and there had been some
abuse there, and that his great-niece had been through
a court guardianship. Although he stated that he still
could be fair and impartial in spite of all this, he was
struck. The third person challenged off the panel by
the Public Guardian was a special-education teacher
in the public schools who voiced a strong opinion
that everybody has a right to make his own decisions whenever possible, including health decisions.
My sole peremptory challenge was against a person who is self-employed as a computer consultant and
had asked to be discharged because she is a sole proprietor in her business and could not afford time away.
Also, she had been a witness in an age-discrimination
lawsuit in which an older employee had identified her
as a younger employee whom the employer had retained while discriminating against the plaintiff as an
older employee. The court pointedly asked me if the
challenge was because the person had asked to be excused, and I responded affirmatively.
Side Bars
Lots of time was spent outside the jurors' presence
discussing questions of evidence, procedure, and
points of law. One especially interesting point was
when one of the Public Guardian's occurrence witnesses started to testify about something I had
allegedly said to her while I was interviewing her as
a hostile witness. I told the court (outside the jurors'
presence) that this thrust me into the position of
having to testify in rebuttal, and this might disqualify
me as counsel for the ADP. I also pointed out that
this amounted to unfair surprise. The court sided
with me on this, over my opponent's objection, and
that aspect of the witness's testimony was never heard
by the jurors.
Generally, the court would conduct a side bar
anytime either side requested one. The court in this
case was extremely strong and practical in making
decisions on the various points as they arose, and
contributed greatly toward the speedy and fluid handling of the trial throughout the entire three days.
Jury Deliberation and Verdict
The jury deliberated less than half an hour. In hindsight, this should not have been surprising, since they
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began deliberating after 5:00 p.m. on the last day of
the trial. I am sure the lateness of the hour contributed to the quick decision.
It is doubtful that a quick decision is good news
for an ADP who is arguing against any guardianship, but if guardianship is necessary, then it should
be only a limited guardian. Limited guardianship is
hard for a layperson to understand.and harder to
apply, so the time pressures present in'this case made
the process all that much more difficult.

Whenever I could not remember my question and a
witness wanted me to repeat it, I said my "lava lamp"
was burning a little low. This, as you may recall,
relates to Ed's having likened competence in many
of our clients to a lava lamp whose fluids and colors
ebb and flow within the lamp that contains them.
At several points, some of the jurors broke out
laughing as I continued to do this. During the trial,
the bailiff several times referred to me as "Mr. Lava
Lamp."

Calling the ADP as a Witness
Deciding to have my client testify proved to be the
critical part of the trial. The ADP rallied and testified well during my direct questioning, and she
appeared to do even better during the Public
Guardian's cross. Unfortunately, her refusal to comply with discovery (written interrogatories, written
request for production for documents, and documents requested at her oral deposition) resulted in a
heated side bar when we finally tried to produce bank
records at the start of the third day of trial. The court
denied the Public Guardian's motion to sanction us
for discovery violations, but we were barred from
using any of the information. We could not get these
items admitted under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule because we did not have the custodian of the records available to testify in court.
Our quest for at least limited guardianship was
significantly damaged by the ADP's reaction to the
judge's ruling barring use of the bank records she
had been so reluctant to produce during discovery.
As a result, we were unable to get her bank records
properly admitted into evidence. The ADP virtually
erupted and kept saying loudly enough for everyone
in the courtroom to hear that I should have used her
records to prove her competence. Even worse, after
she had finished testifying, and while two of the Public Guardian's rebuttal witnesses were testifying, she
actually stood up and went over to opposing counsel's
table and flung her IRA passbook onto the table and
demanded that opposing counsel look at it. When I
polled the alternate juror after the trial was over, he
said the ADP's actions were what did her in as far as
he was concerned. Something tells me that the six
regular jurors probably felt the same way.

Conclusion
This jury trial (and the one before it) was difficult in
many ways for all concerned. Nevertheless, the process did not take significantly longer than a bench
trial would have, and the petitioner certainly had to
follow the rules of evidence and procedure very
closely to get their jury verdict awarding guardianship. The critics of using a jury in an adultguardianship case can continue to be critical if they
wish. Nevertheless, it is clear that the system worked
during those three days (and during the previous
jury trial as well), and there will now be a clearer
path for others to follow in future guardianship jury
cases.
I have a chancery division case coming up soon
in which I represent an elderly woman suing her son
for taking over her life's savings, proceeding to selfdeal, and making horrible investments with the
money. Punitive (or exemplary) damages are being
sought, and a twelve-person jury demand has been
made. Hopefully, the experience gained from the two
previous cases will make my handling of this and
other future jury cases more skilled and effective.
To the extent that the jury trial is a fundamental
and important part of our legal system, and needs to
be considered and pursued in at least some guardianship cases, these two cases were a victory for all
elder-law attorneys. In short, I am not bothered by
the outcome. Rather, I am proud of having been able
to be part of the process.

The Use of Humor
Throughout the trial, I borrowed from an analogy
used by Ed Boyer at an earlier NAELA conference.
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